Review of “The Test of Factual Causation in Negligence and Strict Liability Cases,” By Arno C. Becht & Frank W. Miller by Kohn, Alan C.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1961 Issue 4 
January 1961 
Review of “The Test of Factual Causation in Negligence and Strict 
Liability Cases,” By Arno C. Becht & Frank W. Miller 
Alan C. Kohn 
Coburn, Croft and Cook 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Alan C. Kohn, Review of “The Test of Factual Causation in Negligence and Strict Liability Cases,” By Arno 
C. Becht & Frank W. Miller, 1961 WASH. U. L. Q. 453 (1961). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1961/iss4/9 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
BOOK REVIEWS
This book does not attempt to make every college administrator
his own lawyer. Its primary purpose is to give the college ad-
ministrator an awareness and understanding of basic law and
legal concepts as they relate to the colleges. It is intended to
assist him in planning procedures in order to avoid the possibility
of litigation. By calling attention to the importance of reviewing
day-to-day procedures to make sure they include sound legal
safeguards, it is intended to encourage the recognition of in-
cipient legal difficulties that require the services of an attorney.
The book not only fulfills that purpose and does it well-but also
goes much further. It is a guide-book with which all college admin-
istrators should be familiar.
WENDELL CARNAHANt
THE TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT
LIABILITY CASES, Arno C. Becht and Frank W. Miller. St. Louis:
Washington University Committee on Publications. 1961. Pp. 223.
$4.50.
Dissatisfied with the traditional but-for and Restatement of Torts
tests of factual causation, Professors Becht and Miller, the authors
of this philosophical treatise, propose an entirely new method of
approach to the question of causation in negligence and strict liabil-
ity cases. By the term, "factual causation," the authors refer to
cause-in-fact, or, as it is sometimes called, legal cause. No considera-
tion is given to the problem of proximate causation, and the narrow
question examined is whether defendant's conduct actually caused
plaintiff's harm. That this somewhat narrow inquiry takes 223 pages
to examine is indicative of the book's detail and completeness.
The usual method of determining factual causation is the but-for
test; that is, but for the negligence of A, would B have been harmed;
or, to put it another way, B's harm is not caused by A's negligence if
B would have been harmed without A's negligence. The authors find
inadequate this test and also the Restatement test, which is basically
the but-for test with an additional standard to cover a narrow group
of cases which do not come within the but-for rule.2 The question
t Late Professor of Law, Washington University.
1. Section 432 of the Restatement of Torts provides:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the actor's negligent conduct
is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another if it would
have been sustained even if the actor had not been negligent.
(2) If two forces are actively operating, one because of the actor's
negligence, the other not because of any misconduct on his part, and each
of itself is sufficient to bring about harm to another, the actor's negligence
may be held by the jury to be a substantial factor in bringing it about.
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presented under the Becht-Miller approach, which could be called
the when-and-as test, is whether B would have sustained his exact
harm when and as he did regardless of A's act. If he would have,
A's act is not a cause of B's harm; if he would not have, A's act is
a cause of B's harm.
The emphasis in the when-and-as test is two-fold: (1) A's conduct
must be examined to determine whether B would have been harmed
when and as he was without it; and (2) B's precise harm must be
examined in minute detail to determine whether it would have been
identical without A's conduct. Examining A's conduct under the
when-and-as approach eliminates the requirement of the but-for test
that A's conduct must be a necessary cause of B's harm. For example,
A and B in separate transactions sell rope to C knowing that he is
bent on hanging himself and has tried to do so on several previous
occasions. C uses A's rope and hangs himself. Under the when-and-
as test, A caused C's death because C would not have died when and
as he did (with A's rope) unless A had sold him the rope. Under
the but-for test, however, A did not cause C's death because but for
A's conduct, C would have died anyhow using B's rope. Thus, under
the but-for test, there is no causation unless A's conduct was necessary
in causing C's death, or, stated differently, there is no causation
unless C's death would not have occurred without A's conduct.
Under- the when-and-as test, there is causation as long as A's conduct
did in fact cause C's death and regardless of whether C's death
would have occurred without A's conduct.
Different results are reached also when B's harm is examined
in great detail. For example, A and B negligently, but independently
of each other, shoot C at the same time and each bullet alone would
have caused instantaneous death. Under the when-and-as test, A's
act, as well as B's act, caused C's death, since if C's death is examined
in detail, it is apparent that C would not have died when and as
he did (of two bullets) without A's act or without B's act. Under
the but-for test, on the other hand, neither A's nor B's act is the
cause of C's death because but for A's act, or but for B's act, C
would have died anyhow. Thus, both A and B would escape liability
under the but-for test and neither would escape under the when-and-
as test.
The authors' analysis in depth also requires a distinction between
two basic types of negligence-acts and omissions. Thus, where A
negligently pulls the trigger of his gun and shoots B, his negligence
consists of the act of pulling the trigger, and A's act producing B's
injury is called simple causation. Where, on the other hand, the
negligence consists of an omission, such as the failure of driver A
to keep a lookout for pedestrian B, and the negligent omission
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produces injury to B, the authors call this hypothetical causation.
Where the negligence consists of an act, the when-and-as test is
applied to determine whether the exact harm would have occurred
when and as it did without the negligent act. Where the negligence
is an omission, the when-and-as test is applied by determining
whether the plaintiff would have been harmed when and as he was
with the negligent omission supplied. Thus, in the example where
driver A negligently fails to keep a lookout and strikes and injures
pedestrian B, the negligent omission, failure to keep a lookout, is
supplied and if B's precise injuries would have occurred when and
as they did with A keeping a lookout, then A's negligent omission
is not a cause of B's injuries.
If the authors' test solves some difficulties, it creates others. These
difficulties, occurring either in negligent omission cases or in negli-
gent act cases, arise when A's omission or act is a cause under the
when-and-as test of B's harm, but if A's negligent omission is supplied,
or his negligent act is changed slightly so that it is not negligent, B
would still have sustained substantially the same, although not
identical, harm. In the omission cases, for example, suppose driver
A fails to keep a lookout and hits pedestrian B who darts in front
of A's car. Even if A had kept a lookout, he would have hit B and
caused substantially the same, but not identical, injuries. A rigorous
application of the when-and-as test shows that since B's injuries
would have been slightly different if A had kept a lookout and per-
haps swerved a little, A's negligence was a cause of B's exact injuries.
The authors correctly suggest that the omission to keep a look out
should not be a cause of B's injuries in this case because the injuries
would have been substantially the same regardless of whether A had
kept a lookout. A standard called "equating the injuries" is therefore
applied in order to exonerate A. Comparing the injuries B would
have sustained with a lookout with those he sustained without a
lookout, a determination is made whether the injuries in the two
situations are substantially the same. If they are, then there is no
causation as a matter of law; if they are substantially different,
there is causation as a matter of law; and if it is doubtful whether
they are substantially the same, the jury would determine causation.
The same problem can arise when A's negligence is an act. For
example, driver A is traveling 31 miles per hour in a 30 mile zone
and hits and injures pedestrian B. It is clear B would have sustained
almost the same injuries if A had been driving below the speed limit
at 29 miles per hour. Under the when-and-as test, A's act of speeding
caused B's injuries because they would not have been precisely the
same if A had been traveling at a speed of 29 miles per hour. The
authors properly say that there should be no causation in this type
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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
of-"act" case and suggest that a parallel set of fact situations should
be compared as in the negligent omission cases. Thus, a comparison
is made between B's injuries with A driving at 31 miles per hour and
his injuries with A driving just within speed limits at 29 miles per
hour. If the injuries are substantially the same, there is no causation.
This type of case is called a "parallel series in act case" and arises
generally: (1) where speeding causes harm; (2) where excess
weight causes harm; and (3) where defendant's position in space
causes harm.
A case which recently found its way to the Supreme Court of the
United States is cited by the authors as a good example of judicial
obliviousness to the problem of factual causation. In Kernan v.
American Dredging Co.,2 defendant's tug was towing a scow which
carried a kerosene lantern on its deck. The lantern was three feet
above the water. A navigation rule provided that "scows shall carry
a white light" and that "the white light shall be carried not less than
8 feet above the surface of the water."3 The lamp ignited flammable
vapors on the water and the resulting explosion killed a seaman for
whose death plaintiff sought recovery under the Jones Act,4 a federal
law providing seamen or their survivors with an action against
negligent employers. The district court5 and the court of appeals for
the third circuit6 denied recovery on the ground that the regulation
was not intended to cover the type of accident which occurred. The
Supreme Court reversed in a five-four decision. Mr. Justice Brennan,
speaking for the slender majority, held that even though the naviga-
tion rule was designed to prevent collisions between ships and not
to prevent flammable vapors on the surface of the water from ignit-
ing, still recovery should be allowed because, unlike the common
law, the Jones Act has no requirement that a regulation must be
designed to protect against the type of accident that occurred.
Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Frankfurter, Burton and Whit-
taker, dissented. Although they recognized the problem of causation
in the case,7 the dissenters preferred to grasp the major issue and
argued that the Jones Act does not eliminate the common law re-
2. 355 U.S. 426 (1958).
3. The regulation provided in pertinent part:
Scows not otherwise provided for in this section on waters described in
paragraph (a) of this section shall carry a white light at each end of each
scow.... The white light shall be carried not less than 8 feet above the
surface of the water.... Id. at 427-28.
4. 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 (1920).
5. 141 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
6. 235 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1956).
7. 355 U.S. at 441-42.
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quirement that a regulation must be designed to protect against this
type of accident involved before there can be liability.
The causation problem concerns the wording of the navigation
rule which required a light to be carried at least eight feet above the
water and did not, in negative terms, prohibit a light below eight
feet. The negligence, then, consisted of an omission, failure to have
a light eight feet or more above the surface. Removing the negligent
omission by supplying a light at eight feet (and leaving intact the
light at three feet which itself was not the negligence), the seaman
still would have been killed when and as he was. Defendant's negli-
gence cannot, therefore, be said to have caused the death. Also,
under the conventional but-for test, but for defendant's negligence,
the seaman would still have been killed. The authors conclude that
there was no causation and hence no liability.
As Becht and Miller point out, the only way to justify the decision
is to say that having a light lower than eight feet was a violation of
the regulation and that therefore two lights, one eight feet above
the surface and one three feet, would constitute a violation of the
navigation rule. They find such an interpretation "improbable" and
"difficult to imagine."8 To this reviewer it does not seem unlikely
that if they had faced the problem, the same Justices who held the
statute applicable in this case would also have held that the rule,
which appears to be a little ambiguous,9 called for only one light,
eight feet or more above the water, and that therefore two lights, one
eight feet above the surface and one three feet, violated the rule.
Such an interpretation would justify a finding of causation and con-
sequent liability. Regardless of result, it is unfortunate that appar-
ently the lawyers in the case, and also the courts which had the
facts before them, did not give the problem of causation any serious
consideration.
After explaining in detail their method of analysis, which includes
various assumptions, postulates and corollaries, Professors Becht and
Miller spend the main portion of their book analyzing different types
of factual causation problems. Their most extensive discussion deals
with a most interesting fact situation. A and B are hunting in
separate parties but very close to each other. A bird starts up near
C, and both A and B negligently shoot their shotguns simultaneously
at the bird. A pellet from one of the guns puts C's eye out and it is
impossible to tell from whose gun it came. Is A liable? Is B liable?
Are both A and B liable, or is neither liable?
The problem is one of doubtful causation; either A or B (and not
both) negligently injured C, and it is impossible to tell which one.
8. P. 40.
9. See note 3 supra.
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If C sues both A and B, at trial he can show only that he was injured
and that A or B injured him, but it is a fifty-fifty proposition as to
which of them it was. At the conclusion of C's case, A and B both
argue that they are entitled to directed verdicts because C has not
established by a preponderance of the evidence that A injured him,
nor has C established by a preponderance that B injured him. The
courts are divided on whether to direct a verdict in favor of the de-
fendants or whether to permit plaintiff to go to the jury and recover
against both. 10 The authors favor allowing a recovery against both
A and B and suggest that plaintiff's burden of proof be relaxed in
cases of this kind and that the defendants be forced to exonerate
themselves if they can. There is no logical explanation why one view
should be favored over the other, and any decision to allow a joint
recovery must be based on a policy decision that "to hold otherwise
would be to exonerate both from liability, although each was negligent
and injury resulted from such negligence.""
It does not seem amiss to suggest that where both defendants are
negligent and their negligent acts cause the uncertainty in determin-
ing which of them actually injured the plaintiff, the burden should be
on each defendant to exculpate himself, and if both fail, recovery
against both should be allowed. Plaintiff's case is in the nature of a
converse interpleader action; he interpleads his injury and the negli-
gence of defendants, and each defendant must then show why he
should have judgment in his favor. In some jurisdictions, perhaps
the court would permit a suit for declaratory judgment and hold that
plaintiff makes a prima facie case by showing that he was injured
and that one of the negligent defendants was responsible. Unfortu-
nately, the courts, when they have permitted recovery against both
defendants, have usually done so under the cloak of holding that
defendants are joint tortfeasors, although the requisite concert of
action is missing. As the authors point out, it is preferable simply to
hold that the burden of proof should be relaxed in cases of this kind.
It is not unusual for problems of doubtful causation to arise in
various kinds of situations which may confront the general practi-
tioner of law. For example, plaintiff's property is damaged by one
of several persons who handled it, but it is impossible to determine
which one actually caused the damage. Or, plaintiff's property is
damaged by an explosion, and risk of loss is covered by one of two
insurance policies but it is not clear from the facts of the explosion
which policy is applicable. Certainly, shifting the burden in cases of
this kind is less severe than, as the courts have done in some recent
10. See Prosser, Torts § 45 at pp. 230-31 (2d ed. 1955).
11. Oliver v. Miles, 144 Miss. 852, 860, 110 So. 666, 667 (1926).
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cases, allowing the use of res ipsa loquitur against two or more de-
fendants where not only the causation is doubtful but also liability is
equally unclear.12
Approximately one-third of the book is devoted to a detailed critical
analysis by Professors Becht and Miller of a recent treatise on causa-
tion, Causation in the Law, by Hart and Honor6, i" who are also
professors of law. They have put together a theoretical examination
and justification of the existing law of causation in negligence cases
as well as in intentional torts, contracts and criminal law. Becht and
Miller review the book in detail and criticize the Hart-Honor6 ap-
proach and compare it with their own. The treatise does not seem to
deserve the extensive treatment it is given, and perhaps it would have
been preferable to have worked a discussion of the book into the main
part of the Becht-Miller text, as was done in analyzing the but-for and
Restatement approaches. A study of both books is necessary in order
to compare them or to evaluate the Becht-Miller criticism of Pro-
fessors Hart and Honor6 but it does seem that the Hart-Honor6 effort
is more doctrinaire and less analytical than the Becht-Miller book.
One hypothetical factual situation discussed in the Hart-Honor6
section of the Becht-Miller work is not only interesting but also shows
a difference, both in approach and result, between the two sets of
professors. B and C are going into the desert. A negligently fur-
nishes B with poisoned water. Once out on the desert, B and C
separate and C negligently takes B's poisoned water bag. B dies of
thirst. Is A liable for B's death, or is C liable, or are both or is neither
liable?
The problem is one of a harm from another source, which is dis-
cussed in detail in the main part of the Becht-Miller text 4 as well
as in the analysis of the Hart-Honor6 book.1 5 In the hypothet, Hart
and Honor6 would hold both A and C liable for causing B's death. A
is liable because his negligence would normally have shortened B's
life and did not do so only because of C's negligence, and C's negli-
gence should not exonerate A. C is liable because his negligence
would normally have caused B's death and, again, A's negligence
should not be used to exonerate C.
The Becht-Miller analysis holds A blameless and makes C accept
the entire responsibility for B's death. The authors state that A's
negligence was probably an omission-failure to furnish pure water.
By supplying pure water for B, it is clear that B would have died
12. The cases are collected and analyzed in Note, The Application of Res Ipsa
Loquitur in Suits against Multiple Defendants, 1954 Wash. U.L.Q. 215.
13. The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1959.
14. P. 121-130.
15. P. 202-218.
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precisely when and as he did (of thirst) regardless of what kind of
water A supplied, and therefore A's negligence is not the cause of
B's death. C's negligence was probably an omission also-failure to
notice that he took B's water. By supplying C's negligent omission
and assuming that he did not take the water, it is seen that B would
not have died of thirst but of poisoning. C's negligent omission, then,
is the cause of B's dying of thirst, and Becht and Miller would hold
C liable for causing B's death.
In a variation of this hypothet, the authors assume that A, instead
of negligently supplying B with poisoned water, negligently supplies
him with an empty water bag. C, as before, negligently takes the bag
and B dies of thirst. Although neither's negligence caused B's death
under any causation test, the authors would hold both A and C liable
on the ground that each would have been the cause of B's death by
thirst if it had not been for the other's negligence. In the poisoned
water case, on the other hand, A cannot under any theory be said to
have caused B's death by thirst.
The authors admit that the different results in these two hypothets
is somewhat peculiar in view of the fact that where A sends B into
the desert with poisoned water he comes off better than where he is
apparently less culpable and merely sends B out with an empty water
bag. Under the author's approach, however, there is no way to avoid
this ironic twist. Perhaps some persons might feel better about the
result if they speculate that C eventually drank the poisoned water
and died, in which case A would be liable for C's death even though
he is not liable for the death of B. In any event, the result reached by
Becht and Miller in the two cases seems better than holding that in
both cases neither A nor C is liable for B's death, which would be the
result reached by application of the but-for or Restatement test.
One of the authors' basic positions throughout the entire book is
that evaluative or normative considerations can and should be ex-
cluded from an analysis of factual causation. Indeed, this is one of
the basic tenets of the book and one of the reasons for disapproving
of the but-for and Restatement tests of causation. While it does
appear that a strict application of the when-and-as test in every
situation avoids normative considerations, the authors admit that it
cannot be strictly applied in every ease. For example, where A's
negligent omission causes B's harm under the when-and-as test, the
authors say that A should not be liable if B's harm would have been
substantially the same even without A's negligence. Such a limitation
is clearly appropriate, but it seems little different from the Restate-
ment requirement 16 that A's negligence be a "substantial factor" in
16. Section. 431 of the Restatement of Torts requires that the actor's conduct
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causing B's harm, which the authors criticize on the ground that it is
normative. The value of the Becht-Miller approach is not that it
eliminates normative considerations but that it uncovers and sepa-
rates them from the factual problems of the law of causation. In the
but-for and Restatement tests, on the other hand, normative and
factual aspects are hidden and lumped together.
Professors Becht and Miller have painstakingly presented a new,
fresh and thorough approach to the question of factual causation.
In fact, the book seems a little too thorough in that unnecessary detail
and apologia tend to distract the reader at times. While the but-for
and Restatement tests of causation are adequate in most cases, the
Becht-Miller method is a valuable tool in analyzing difficult problems
of factual causation which the other tests cannot resolve. The
authors' method arguably creates more difficulties than it solves, but
the merit of the approach is that it exposes problems which the
but-for and Restatement tests conceal. Although consideration has
been given in this review to some of the more unusual examples
discussed in the book, many of the hypotheticals analyzed by the
authors are common factual situations which a general practitioner
might expect to encounter. Nevertheless, the book was not written
primarily for the practicing lawyer but, rather, for the philosopher
of law, whether he be a lawyer, a judge, a teacher or a layman. It
brings to the problem of factual causation a new jurisprudential
approach not unlike the approach logical positivism has given to
philosophy generally. While it is "prudent advocacy.., not to argue
a case to a court merely on grounds derived from a philosopher of
law,"'1 7 still, many of the ideas contained in this philosophical book
well may gradually find their way into the main stream of the law.
ALAN C. KOHNt
be "a substantial factor in bringing about the harm" in order for there to be
causation.
17. Patterson, Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law 329 (1953).
t Member of the Missouri Bar; associate, Coburn, Croft and Cook, St. Louis,
Missouri.
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